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Building the Haitian National Police: A Retrospective and Prospective View

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International peacekeeping and post-conflict operations proliferated during the 1990s, generating a wide variety of case studies with results both good and bad. Key among these experiences was the effort to establish a civilian police agency in Haiti. A retrospective review of what happened in building the Haitian National Police (HNP) is important for several reasons. First, the effort was extremely wide-ranging, beginning with military action in 1994 and followed by assistance in political and social institution building. Second, the complexity of the undertaking forced the international community to recognize the need to improve its peacekeeping and assistance apparatus. The United Nations created the Lessons Learned Unit in 1995, which reported on how to upgrade multidisciplinary peacekeeping,[1] leading to the strengthening of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Peacekeeping training academies have also been started, training curricula and formats have been standardized, and access to training has been broadened by putting training courses online. Now that nearly 10 years have passed since the initial planning and design of the assistance effort in Haiti, it is time to revisit outcomes over the longer term so that the practitioners called upon to face the daunting peacekeeping challenges in the decade ahead can avoid repeating past mistakes and build on what works. Reexamination may also help to identify steps to improve the situation in Haiti itself since the goals set for the HNP have yet to be met, and the lack of security and legitimacy has impaired domestic tranquility and made it harder to combat drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and transnational crime.

Understanding the keys to justice sector reform is vital to making peacekeeping elsewhere sustainable, and in putting democratization back on course in Haiti itself. A good head start in documenting the Haitian experience and distilling useful lessons has been made. Analyzing what happened in Haiti has been central to many of the most influential works on peacekeeping operations, including the National Defense University's *Policing the New World Disorder*,[2] numerous writings by Rachel Neild of the Washington Office on Latin America,[3] and Dr. David Bayley's 2001 publication *Democratizing the Police Abroad*.[4]

This paper will look at the history of the effort to build a new civilian

police in Haiti to identify its programmatic strengths and weaknesses, its successes and failures. But before looking back it is useful to take stock of where things stand today in Haiti, where the ultimate outcome of the police development program still sways in the balance between "protecting and serving the public"as recruits were trained to do or reverting to a repressive arm of the state. If the stakes are apparent for Haiti, they may be just as large for the rest of us. What happens in this small Caribbean country may tell us much about our prospects for building a more just and terror-free world in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

HNP AT THE CROSSROADS

In 1996 great hope stirred that the newly created civilian HNP, with its personnel recruited from the community and trained in the principles of democratic policing, would lead to a stable and safe society. Today, that hope languishes. Despite the difficulty of reporting definitively on the HNP's status due to the limited authoritative information available from Haiti in the wake of the international community's progressive disengagement, at least four areas of concern are frequently cited as indication of the force's deterioration. Most apparent is the loss of senior leaders such as Robert Manuel, Pierre Denize, and Eucher Joseph (the former secretary of state for justice, the HNP's former director general, and its former inspector general, respectively), who supported development of a professional, apolitical police force and active investigation of corruption within its ranks. An even more disturbing indicator is the recent incorporation into management ranks of former Forces Armees d'Haiti (FAd'H) officers, many with demonstrated personal loyalty to the country's current political leaders and/or to persons vetted out of police work, whether with the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) or the permanent HNP. These two trends have fed a third concern, the increasing politicization of the HNP. For example some HNP officers are alleged to have colluded in the acts of violence that marred and disrupted voting in the 2000 election.[5] This stands in sharp contrast to the performance of the newly formed and trained HNP that, despite its inexperience, earned relatively high marks for its handling of security in the local and presidential elections of December 1995. A fourth concern is the level of attrition in the ranks from the original core group of over 5,000 police officers trained under the guidance of the international community at the Haitian Police Training Center (HPTC).[6] These individuals represented a new paradigm for policing in Haiti. They were recruited through competitive, apolitical processes, trained extensively in the rule of law and human rights, and deployed under a totally civilian chain of command. They left the HPTC with the highest ideals, believing that they would be vital agents of change in their country. It is unclear how many remain in the HNP, which may have declined to only 3,000 personnel, and whether they retain any real influence on institutional direction.

Judging today's HNP by its performance yields a series of paradoxes.

Judging today's HNP by its performance yields a series of paradoxes. The Haitian government has repeatedly failed to sign formal agreements with the U.S. on narcotics control and law enforcement; yet at the operational level, such as in matters pertaining to maritime interdiction, some assigned HNP units behave as though agreements were in force. Despite serious concerns about police and governmental corruption, particularly in matters of the drug trade, the narcotics unit (BLTS) and Haitian Coast Guard continue to work tactically with DEA and the U.S. Coast Guard to combat trafficking through Haiti.[7] In addition, in October 2001 Haiti joined the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and has since made positive contributions.[8] And despite concerns over the HNP's ability to conduct criminal investigations, particularly with a dwindling number of Judicial Police, recent indictments were made in the death of a prominent journalist, and we are aware of at least one documented case of the Judicial Police unit unearthing valuable information to support a U.S. prosecution. Finally, while reports and documentation of HNP failures in human rights are numerous, the degree and scale fail to rival the brutality of security forces under the Duvalier and military regimes.

In the fog of contradiction emanating from Haiti about the HNP, one notable commentary seems to encapsulate the current state of affairs. In an open letter to the Superior Council of the HNP, dated October 18, 2001, Jean Marie Cherestal, president of the National Coalition for Human Rights, cites numerous examples of politicization, and the violation of human rights.[9] Whether or not everyone agrees on all the letter's details, Mr. Cherestal has struck a chord shared by many fellow citizens as well as observers from the international community, when he states: "The new force was seen as a carrier of hope for a stable society, one that would consolidate the respect for one and the respect for all. Today the national police have been discredited in the eyes of the Haitian people and no longer inspire confidence."

Although the HNP is reaping most of the disappointment, there is more than enough blame to go around. By the inauguration of the Clinton Administration in January 1993 it was increasingly clear that the U.S. government, and likely other international actors, would soon intervene in Haiti. Policymakers understood that amongst the first and foremost steps in restoring peace to that troubled island would be the need to reestablish public security. Indeed, within weeks of the November 1992 U.S. elections, government planners had drafted an initial plan of action for creation of a civilian police force in Haiti. By spring of 1993, U.S. police development experts began to actively engage the OAS and the UN, and teams of specialists had been dispatched to Haiti to initiate planning and to lay the foundations for establishing a new, democratically based public security service.

If we are to understand how the HNP arrived at its present state and how public policymakers can stem its progressive dissolution, we must draw on 10 years of hindsight to see what failures and what untapped strengths stem from the roots of the institution's formation.

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF THE PROCESS

The strategic planning process proved to be both a strength and, in retrospect, a weakness in providing police development assistance. It laid the groundwork for early successes and led to some of the later failures. One strength of the process was the ability to look backward and forward. The U.S. government (USG) carefully reviewed prior post-conflict projects in Panama and El Salvador for lessons, and drafted a detailed plan for the creation of a new civilian police before the intervention of September 1994. Indeed, strategic planning began shortly after the signing of the 1993 Governor's Island Accords, culminating in a comprehensive development plan by December of that year. Implementation was put on hold for more than a year when the *Harlan County* sailed out of Port-au-Prince harbor and the agreements in the Accords broke down.

To integrate Haitian input into the earliest planning and to achieve Haitian government "buy-in," USG staff traveled to Haiti on numerous occasions and met with a broad spectrum of Haitian legal experts, civil society representatives, and academics. In Washington, staff consulted extensively with President Aristide's government-in-exile. These consultations resulted in three broad agreements on prerequisites for development of the new police. First, the new police service needed to be created from the ground up rather than by transitioning existing units of the FAd'H. Second, a new (organic) law must be drafted to define the mission, role, and function of the new police in a manner consistent with policing in a democracy.[10] Third, police salaries had to constitute a living wage to prevent endemic corruption from the start.

"buy-in" [on principles guiding HNP development] did not lead to timely appointments to key government oversight positions.

From his Georgetown office, exiled President Aristide agreed to support these three recommendations, and they formed the principles guiding development of the HNP. They were also the bedrock of a planning process whose scope and detail was unprecedented in the history of police development assistance.

Despite this achievement the process also had a number of weaknesses, perhaps more readily identifiable in hindsight. First, the efforts to achieve "buy-in" through discussions with President Aristide, his ministers-in-exile, and other Haitians in the U.S., Haiti, and elsewhere

did not lead to timely appointments to key government oversight positions. In fact, for the first few months the HNP was being set up, all of its members were new line recruits, with no director general or other clearly designated official to whom they would report. The original planning had called for Haiti's elected president to appoint a senior management corps to be trained ahead of or in tandem with the first class of new recruits so when the new force was deployed it could hit the ground running. When this did not happen a vacuum was created, and day-to-day decisions affecting the design, training, and deployment of the new HNP had to be made by the international community.[11]

The valuable role of NGOs and civil society was underestimated in the planning process.

It was not until after deployment of the core HNP in 1995, and the selection of Pierre Denize as director general (DG) in early 1996, that substantive Haitian involvement in the police development program really began. The selection of DG Denize, by newly elected President Preval, ended a cycle of failures and missteps by the Aristide administration that lasted nearly a year and a half. For months after the U.S. intervention the post of DG remained vacant, and when someone was finally appointed in the spring of 1995, he proved to be well meaning but ineffective. Then in July 1995 Inspector General Eucher Joseph, arguably the most effective HNP manager, was removed from his position without explanation. Even more ominously, at the end of 1995, with the Aristide administration on in its way out, a former FAd'H officer, who had been refused entry into IPSF training during the vetting process of holdover security officers following the international intervention, was named director general. These actions caused the U.S. to initiate its withdrawal from the police assistance program with the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) going so far as to begin packing up its equipment. With the change of administrations in February 1996, Preval's replacement of the tainted DG with Denize, and reinstatement of Eucher Joseph as IG, the U.S. continued its police assistance and the international community finally had viable Haitian working partners.

Second, the valuable role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups was significantly underestimated in the strategic planning process. Looking back the fundamental inconsistency is glaring between our understanding that sustainable changes in governmental institutions require years, and perhaps a generation to achieve, and the fact that bilateral donors and multinational agencies view their assistance efforts in much shorter terms. The gap between the attention span of the international community and the actual time necessary to bring about fundamental social and institutional changes must be filled by NGOs and indigenous civil society groups that are essential stakeholders in and advocates for change. Over the long-term, efforts to strengthen the capabilities of these groups will likely determine the success or failure of the original primary investment made by the international community. In Haiti, these groups were slow to develop and inadequately supported by international assistance.

Third, planning for the other justice sector components — prosecutors, magistrates, and courts — was conducted separately rather than integrating all the actors into a comprehensive development plan. To this day, years after the final deployment of the new HNP, development of the other justice sector institutions significantly lags behind that of law enforcement.

This failure to integrate the justice system at the outset, in turn, has hampered further police development and prevented its consolidation, despite a relatively advanced head start. This should not be surprising. Any component of an interdependent system is almost doomed to fail unless the others are progressing at an equal pace. Whether it's a peacekeeping mission or a bilateral justice sector assistance program, all components — police, prosecutors, the judiciary, and prisons — are so interrelated that any effective program of assistance must include each component in the planning stage. This is not to say that each component must receive the same level of assistance, nor that one donor should be responsible for assistance to all components, but the end state of the mission should have each component functioning at sufficient and comparable levels to assure that the justice sector can at least fulfill its basic responsibilities. This requires: 1) a police force capable of main-

taining order and investigating crimes; 2) a prison system that can house individuals pending trial and after sentencing in a humane manner; 3) prosecutors who are well-qualified and trained to prosecute cases before the court; 4) a cadre of defense attorneys capable of defending the rights of the accused; and 5) a judiciary that can effectively carry out its dual role of administering justice and providing the necessary checks and balances to assure that police, prison officials, and prosecutors are operating within the law and accepted norms, including international standards of human rights.

What happened in Haiti points out how short-term and overly narrow thinking about security and the justice system can undermine the quick progress being made at the outset. Police programs, even when the entire force must be built from the ground-up as was the case in Haiti, can often be implemented more quickly than major changes in other parts of the judicial system. International parties are understandably anxious to restore order and to facilitate an "exit strategy" for peacekeeping forces as soon as possible. The deployment of indigenous police is often seen as a prerequisite for withdrawal of foreign troops (a priority not only for the nations providing troops, but to the host nation trying to protect its sovereignty and pride). If that accomplishment is not to be hollow, however, other steps need to be taken.

Failure of Haitian judicial reform to keep pace with police programs has had serious repercussions.

Failure of Haitian judicial reform to keep pace with police programs has had a number of serious repercussions. In addition to lack of due process for those incarcerated and serious human rights problems, ineffective prosecutorial and court systems have made it virtually impossible for HNP managers to rein in rogue officers even when the cases are referred for prosecution by the police inspector general. The justice system's inability to provide oversight and ensure that police conduct adheres to the law was identified by one former DG as the single biggest threat to the HNP's effectiveness and political neutrality. This is not to imply, in any way, that police development should be restrained so it doesn't get "out front." As Somalia demonstrated, delay in deploying police can result in continued disorder that precludes any substantive judicial and political development efforts. Rather plans for development of the judicial apparatus must be brought up to speed and operate on timetables closely coordinated with police development.

Perhaps the most glaring failure of planning can be found in the state of prisons. This should not be surprising. Penal facilities are often the orphans of international development efforts for the simple reason that reforming the corrections sector is extraordinarily complex and difficult. It operates out of public view in most societies and therefore has the highest potential for human rights abuses. Prison reform also tends to be costly because substantial rehabilitation of physical infrastructure is required. Neither host government officials nor the international community are eager to divert scarce resources to the sector. In Haiti no one wanted ownership of the problem in 1994. The U.S. military, by default, took on the early role of cataloging prisoners, providing medical attention, and maintaining security at the National Penitentiary. Intolerable conditions eventually forced the international community to push for prison reform, starting with a joint effort by the various components of the UN mission and then a formal program through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

FILLING THE SECURITY GAP — INTERIM POLICING

The concept of the security gap and the need to undertake appropriate planning to bridge it are well documented in existing literature.[12] Perhaps the most striking example prior to Haiti occurred when the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) collapsed following Operation Just Cause, leaving a serious public security void. With no contingency plans to stand up a new policing and security force, the USG had to organize quickly the training and deployment of former PDF personnel, who were put through a hastily developed three-week "transition training" course conducted by ICITAP.[13] With this example still fresh in their minds, planners prior to the intervention in Haiti drew up a two-pronged program for an "interim" indigenous force, supervised by international police moni-

tors, who would help hold the fort while the new HNP was recruited, trained, and deployed. To understand the choice that was made, it is useful to understand the options available.

The Interim Public Security Force (IPSF)

There are three major categories of interim policing. First, in extreme cases the international peacekeeping force assumes direct responsibility, utilizing the military, civilian police monitors, or some combination of both (as was done in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example). This situation typifies the initial stage of most post-conflict interventions, even when the local police force has not been disbanded, usually out of necessity to restore and keep order since the legitimacy of the prior chain of command is broken or in disarray. Second, an interim police force can be created from vetted members of the old police force. Often, this force is redeployed under the supervision of international police monitors, pending the recruitment and training of a new police force. (This happened in Haiti, and to some extent El Salvador.) The third option skips the interim force and moves directly into reconstituting a new force from members of the former, and usually militaristic, police force. Some veterans are discharged during vetting for prior human rights violations and other criminal activities, and all retained personnel are systematically put through a retraining course (Panama is such an example).

Vetting [the IPSF] was difficult given the limited hard data available.

Since police forces in failed states or states emerging from an authoritarian regime tend to be discredited in the public eye, temporary assumption of policing duties by a multinational force provides the greatest likelihood of rapidly developing a values-driven style of law enforcement pending the creation of new police institutions. However, this puts peacekeepers in a difficult and legally sensitive bind. They are asked to intervene in the everyday life of people who are not fellow citizens and are likely to have unfamiliar local laws and customs. Moreover they are asked to maintain public order when they themselves are often a patchwork of national forces not trained to operate as a cohesive group, with no clear mandate and no uniform procedures and operational priorities.

Attempts to bridge these contradictions in filling the security gap led to the creation of the IPSF in Haiti. Some 3,000 vetted holdovers from the FAd'H received transition training before being deployed in late 1994 under the watchful eye of the Multinational Forces (MNF). Vetting was difficult given the limited hard data available on criminal records or activities and human rights abuses. Although many former FAd'H were cleared for duty based on information available, some went through training and were even redeployed before being denounced by local citizens. Where corroboration of charges was possible, accused members of the IPSF were removed from service.

IPSF members were put through a six-day program, based on the Panamanian model to transition vetted members of the disbanded PDF to the new civilian Panama National Police (PNP). The IPSF regimen was, of course, not a true police training course, but rather an "orientation" to concepts of a civilian police "service" mission grounded on clear human rights/human dignity standards. The incentive for the ex-FAd'H to participate and comply was significant, namely continued pay and the hope of acceptance into the new HNP. In fact, most IPSF members would be phased out rapidly with the deployment of the HNP, beginning in the spring of 1995. Virtually no former FAd'H were accepted into the HNP Training Center, despite President Aristide's agreement to permit retention of as many as 10 percent, mostly because they failed to meet the educational and other selection criteria for the new force.

The Haiti example demonstrates that the need for an interim police force may be unavoidable, but when its members have been discredited by past associations and are seen as a danger to future public welfare, the holdovers must be closely supervised. Real public order depends on the willing compliance of law-abiding citizens, not on coercion and fear. An interim force based on the past faces long odds of ever winning public trust even if that is its intention. Even the short-term rationale of restoring order may be beyond them. Ex-FAd'H personnel were held in such low regard by Haitians that the interim force was not much more than a "fig leaf" for the MNF civilian police and military units that patrolled with them.

Reinventing the Police Monitor

The international civilian police-monitoring mission in Haiti was a watershed event. Not only was it the first such mission to be armed, but the monitors were to be interactive participants rather than passive observers in reestablishing law enforcement. What was a radical departure then is now standard procedure in other post-conflict interventions.

Although there were two major implementation phases in Haiti, under two international civilian police missions, continuity was maintained across the transfer of authority. In early 1995, the MNF ceded control to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and police monitoring became the responsibility of the UN CivPol. Disruption was minimal since the majority of the international police monitors already there simply "changed hats" and put on UN CivPol blue berets.

Haiti showed just how critical international civilian police monitors are to peacekeeping. It also showed how the mission and roles of police monitors can be defined in advance and integrated into the overall police development effort. An international monitoring force can play a variety of roles, and spelling them out clearly should be done early in an intervention if they are to be carried out effectively.

The U.S.-led MNF included a 900-member civilian police-monitoring unit. Monitors received a three-day orientation by ICITAP, in Puerto Rico, prior to deployment. They were not only informed about their duties and the nature of the mission, but also given an overview of the "transition" training and copies of training materials to be provided to the IPSF, whom they would monitor.

Haiti was one of the first efforts to integrate classroom training with field training by monitors.

CivPol performed the full gamut of policing responsibilities. Like their MNF predecessors they were armed, and provided with clear rules of engagement. They continued to serve as police monitors, but their responsibilities as field-training officers (FTOs) took on added importance since they now began to work with personnel who would be part of the new HNP. The role of CivPol in the development of the HNP, vis-à-vis that of other bilateral donors, was clearly defined during the early stages of the UN Mission and integrated into the overall police assistance effort. By enlisting CivPol as a partner in development of the HNP and providing monitors with all training materials used at the HPTC, significant progress was made toward standardization of policing methods by assuring that what was taught in the classroom would be reinforced in the field.

Haiti was one of the first efforts to integrate classroom training with field training by monitors, and at least during the early stages it may well be the best example of an implementation model. Later, as discussed in the Donor Coordination section below, a disconnect developed between classwork at the HPTC and practice in the field, largely due to the frequency of UN staff rotation and the lapse of previously negotiated agreements as people who negotiated and implemented them left the country. Unfortunately, this foreshadowed what has happened subsequently since inconsistency between classroom and field training tends to be more norm than exception, and similar problems exist in other post-conflict situations such as Bosnia and Kosovo.

Demobilization Support and Assistance

If planners understood the need from the outset to build a new police force from the ground up, they also were concerned about what would happen to demobilized security forces from the former regime. In approaching the complex issues associated with dismantling the FAd'H, the international community was armed with the experience in El Salvador where demobilization proved to be extremely problematic. In El Salvador, many discharged military personnel were without job skills, and there was no plan to help them reenter the civilian economy. A significant number formed into gangs of armed bandits, and the crime rate skyrocketed. To mitigate any such aftershock in Haiti, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives funded a job training program for ex-FAd'H members. Despite its best efforts, the program fell short for two reasons. Although most of the displaced FAd'H personnel received training, the Haitian economy failed to grow sufficiently for trainees to find jobs. And the Haitian population, suffering from extreme poverty, objected

to training and economic support for their former oppressors.

DONOR COORDINATION

If the security gap following international interventions is now better understood, another kind of gap is widely known but rarely talked about meaningfully, — a gap between means and ends that involves not only material resources but timeframes and responsibilities. Defining the respective roles of the UN and bilateral participants is of particular importance in police development. Although Security Council Resolutions initiating peacekeeping efforts frequently describe UN CivPol authority in broad terms — such as monitoring, reporting, and training — in practice CivPol is generally understaffed and unprepared to carry out its tasks in the field. Certainly there is a shortage of CivPol members with the technical expertise to conduct the full range of police development and training activities required.

Haiti underlines the importance of developing a unified framework for guiding donor coordination and cooperation.

The Haiti project initially seemed to be a model for effective cooperation. Because of the amount of preplanning and communication among UN, Canadian, and French officials, the U.S. entered Haiti with reasonably well-defined roles supporting the creation, training, and institutional development of the new HNP. General agreement had also been reached on the substance of the training curricula and training philosophy. The U.S. was responsible for basic recruit training (supported by the Canadian and French governments), and UN CivPol (initially under Canadian command) implemented an extensive FTO program. At least in the early phases of the program, despite differences in policing methods exhibited by the numerous national police agencies comprising the MNF and CivPol in Haiti, consistency in field training was maintained by using the standardized lessons plans from the HPTC as the basis for CivPol mentoring of the HNP. Unfortunately, this practice deteriorated as staff delegated by member nations to CivPol rotated in and out of Haiti. The diversity of policing styles became very problematic, and field monitoring strayed from what recruits were taught at the HPTC. This remains a serious problem, recognized yet unresolved, that persists in CivPol operations worldwide.

The Haiti experience underlines the importance of developing a uniform planning framework to guide donor coordination and cooperation. This framework should incorporate substantive input from local authorities and the communities they serve to define major responsibilities of the local police as well as the essential areas of assistance. Potential assistance providers need to agree on their respective roles, and how they will be carried out, to foster a uniform and consistent development effort in which contributions reinforce rather than work against one another. Not only must the aims of donor programs be coordinated carefully, but also all donors must work within the agreed-upon framework for implementation. Hammering out these agreements in advance of the mission can considerably reduce the potential for later conflict among donors by more effectively targeting resources and reducing overlap.[14]

Obviously local input is needed if these agreements are to become sustainable on the ground. Yet in failed states, and in some post-conflict interventions, there may be no sitting government (or recognized government) to act as a partner with which to coordinate preparation of an initial strategic plan. This was certainly the case in Somalia in 1993 and 1994. For the most part, donors faced the same situation when planning for police development in Haiti was initiated in 1993. In these circumstances, planning, coordination, and consensus on approach among donors becomes not simply desirable but a necessity. An essential part of that agreement needs to be a clear understanding that coordination of donor activities must include the host nation as soon as it can support such an effort. Technical assistance to the host nation in strategic planning and coordination should be an early priority. And, even in those cases where a formal government has not been established, every effort must be made to engage the local community in project development and planning through NGOs, academia, and civil society groups.

As part of the donor-supported police reform program in Haiti, technical advisors were

assigned to Director General Denize (after his appointment in February 1996) to work with his staff on developing planning skills and drafting their own HNP five-year Strategic Development Plan.

This Haitian plan became the framework for further direction and coordination of donor efforts, and it was the cornerstone of discussions at regularly scheduled donor meetings, chaired by DG Denize. At these meetings, UN, U.S., Canadian, and French representatives reviewed progress and discussed how they could assist in implementing the plan.

Haiti shows that putting donor coordination in the hands of the host government as quickly as feasible assures host-government buy-in to the development process. This may require technical assistance to host government institutions to enable them to develop strategic planning and coordination tools. During 2001, this lesson was refined and tested in Nigeria, where technical assistance to the government was aimed at developing a strategic plan for police reform that fully integrated members of civil society into the planning process.

WHAT TO DO AND NOT TO DO

Practitioners responsible for implementing future police development programs on the ground can draw practical operational lessons from Haiti. As we have seen, the Haiti police development effort itself has been part of a continuum in "lessons learned." While the Haiti experience validated "lessons" learned in previous missions, it also showed that some "lessons" don't transfer (for example, the demobilization jobs training program). Haiti of course also generated many valuable new insights, some of them widely implemented and others still not fully appreciated. We now examine these lessons in turn.

Haiti generated many valuable new insights: some widely implemented and others still underappreciated.

1. There must be a functioning government authority.

The U.S. entered Haiti mindful of Somalia. For police development efforts to be effective, there must be a functioning government authority to which the police report. This provides police agencies with legitimacy and oversight, as well as guidance and the means for taking remedial action against unacceptable behavior within its own ranks — a key to protecting human rights. Not only is it ineffective to build a police unit in the absence of a government authority, it could be considered irresponsible to create an armed force in the absence of a legitimate government oversight body. In Haiti, this governing authority was skeletal and largely ineffective for the first few months of the police development process, but benefited significantly with the appointment of Bob Manuel as deputy minister and Pierre Denize as director general after President Preval took office in February 1996.

2. Police authority and organization need a legal basis.

It is extremely difficult to plan for the organization and training of a police unit until its mission, functions, and authority are defined.[15] Experience in dozens of police development projects has demonstrated that drafting or updating a "police law" (also known as an organic law) needs to be one of the first steps in creating an institutionalized force. The police law defines the mission and core functions of the institution, and establishes its authority and limits thereon. From this flow the organizational development, policies, procedures, and training requirements that will be at the core of the development effort.

The history of the Haitian Police Law, which defined the nature of the new HNP and provided a road map for its development, demonstrates that drafting and enacting a legal charter is neither automatic nor easy. Changing missions and roles, even when the security forces are despised for their long history of corruption and repression (as was the case with Haiti's FAd'H), meets resistance because reform can severely impact major players both inside and outside of the police. This is true particularly in post-conflict countries where many institutions are corrupt, vested interests are entrenched, and where criminal activity has served as a major source of income for high-ranking officials. Challenging the status quo maintained by the FAd'H by presenting the new Police Law to the Haitian Parliament probably

cost Justice Minister Guy Malary his life in October 1993.

3. The first steps toward restoring order must be seen as a process leading toward institutional transparency and accountability.

The initial training of a new police force in a situation like Haiti's in 1994 is predicated on the need to respond to short-term security requirements. However, that is only the beginning not the end of building an environment for long-term security through the creation and development of self-sustaining civilian police institutions.[16] Assuming that a police organic law has already been passed, the most basic elements in laying a foundation for the future include: 1) development of selection and recruitment standards and processes; 2) establishment of a strong organizational base, including oversight mechanisms to assure accountability, such as an inspector general or an office of professional responsibility; 3) formulation and promulgation of police policies and operational procedure manuals; 4) creation of institutional capacity to sustain basic and in-service training programs over the long term, and development of curricula that link directly to law, as well as to policies and procedures; and 5) technical assistance to develop planning and budgeting processes that assure the host government learns how to sustain police reforms after foreign assistance ends. All of these bases were covered in planning and early implementation for a viable HNP.

Experience shows that recruitment of new [police] from civilian life is more effective than retraining holdover personnel.

The promulgation of police policies and procedures, including operating manuals, was a cornerstone of institutional development in Haiti. Documenting policies and procedures is essential because without clear parameters of what activities are or are not permissible, it becomes almost impossible to hold individual officers accountable for their behavior. Accountability also necessitates well-functioning and objective oversight mechanisms to investigate cases of alleged abuses or wrongdoing. In Haiti, a strong Office of Inspector General (OIG) was created to investigate reported misconduct, and take administrative measures as appropriate. However, as mentioned earlier, the OIG was unable to prosecute police offenders due to weakness in other parts of the justice system

4. Consideration must be given to rebuilding the police from the ground up rather than recycling holdover personnel.

The quickest and ostensibly the easiest solution to the "security gap" is to put frontline police back on the streets as soon as possible. This was done in Panama, where the new civilian police force was made up entirely of screened personnel from the defunct Panama Defense Force, who were declared retrained and fit for service after completing a 21-day transition-training course.[17] In planning for Haiti, the obvious shortcomings of the Panama effort were noted, and for the most part were avoided by resolving to severely limit any participation of the former FAd'H in the new HNP. By February 1996, the last FAd'H police units (by then converted into the Interim Public Security Force) had been replaced with new civilian recruits to the HNP. Despite some start-up problems with the recruiting process, the HNP proved early on to be a politically neutral civilian institution with a human rights record far superior to its military predecessor.

Whether the mission is in a failed state or an emerging democracy, experience has shown that recruitment and infusion of new personnel from civilian life has been more effective in building responsive and responsible police institutions than retraining holdover security personnel, particularly when they have operated inside a military-like organization. However, it should be understood that utilizing totally new personnel for a newly constituted force comes at a price. As experience in Haiti demonstrated, a force built from inexperienced recruits takes longer to stand on its feet and maintain public order. Raw recruits need additional specialized training, and perhaps even more importantly, they need to develop "street smarts" through firsthand experience. This may entail a longer life for the interim security force, and more demands on international monitors. However when the "old" force is unredeemingly corrupt, politicized, or abusive of human rights, the long-term benefits of quickly disbanding that structure and phasing

out its personnel will likely outweigh the cost — provided the international community agrees to "stay the course" long enough for the new institution to take root.

5. Personnel for both the interim and permanent forces must be vetted for human rights violations and criminal behavior prior to training.

In any project where holdover security personnel are to be retained in an interim capacity or hired to staff a new police institution, strict screening standards need to be established and applied before training, and maintained over the life of the program.

The issue of vetting personnel was addressed in Haiti far more stringently and methodically than in previous interventions. The policy was not to train anyone who had not been checked against several human rights and criminal databases. No one was trained whose background was deemed unsuitable.[18] This standard applied to both the IPSF and HNP. Later it was expanded to cover members of other units, such as the Palace Security Guards. As previously mentioned, in late 1995, U.S. participation in police development operations was suspended until unsuitable personnel were removed. This hard line, not always popular, paid some long-term dividends in Haiti.

Experience shows a direct correlation between low salaries and a tolerance for corruption.

6. The inverse relationship between pay and corruption must be recognized.

There is a natural tendency to equate increased numbers of police personnel with increased security and more effective policing. However, experience in resource-depleted developing nations does not necessarily support this concept. Indeed, there can be a significant trade-off between the number of police and their salary level. Many developing countries opt for more personnel by paying them less, or in an untimely manner. Unfortunately, experience in virtually every developing country shows a direct correlation between low salaries and prevalence of corruption. Examples abound of extremely large numbers of police personnel kept on the payroll at such low wages that acceptance of bribes or engagement in extortion is required just to support a family. A smaller force that is well-trained, efficiently deployed, and paid a living wage may be far more effective than a larger force that must rely on outside sources of income merely to survive. A better paid and managed police force can actually cost far less than a larger force whose members are poorly trained and remunerated. Of course, the latter tends to characterize authoritarian regimes, where police are used to control the population and where the majority of their remuneration is off the book and from illicit endeavors.

The USG entered the planning process for Haiti with an understanding that a large, poorly paid force would likely become part of the security problem rather than its solution. The USG program worked directly with the Haitian government-in-exile to reach consensus on the need for payment of a living wage to HNP officers. Granted, reasonable salaries did not eradicate police corruption in Haiti, any more than it has in North America, Western Europe, or elsewhere. This is especially true where the corrupting influences of large amounts of drug money are involved. However, following initial deployment of the HNP, the average citizen could expect to go about his or her business freely, or report a crime without fear of retribution or being forced to pay a bribe.

7. The length and content of training must be appropriate to the police mission.

In Haiti, as in virtually every peacekeeping mission, creating or professionalizing indigenous security forces is part of the "exit strategy." This means that the greater the political pressure for rapid withdrawal of international troops, the greater the pressure to put new police on the street before they can perform responsibly. If stopping the bloodshed is to be more than a temporary ceasefire, however, length and content of training must fit the police mission and meet local needs for professionalization.

Development of the HNP training curricula provides a positive example of effective international donor coordination. The curriculum and supporting lesson plans were developed in ICITAP headquarters during the summer of 1994 by a team of U.S. police experts, Canadian police trainers seconded from the Royal Cana-

dian Mounted Police Academy, and an expatriate Haitian attorney. The lesson plans were later reviewed by French police officials and provided to police monitors from all nations for use in field training. A mix of U.S., Canadian, and French police officers, Haitian attorneys, and human rights monitors provided the training.

The original schedule developed in 1993 included a six-month program of HNP training for each class of recruits. Following intervention in 1994, however, the timeframe shrank to four months in order to accommodate the ever-shrinking window in which 5,000 new police had to be trained and deployed.[19] While nearly every independent review praised the effort to recruit, train, and deploy the new HNP, almost everyone also found training to be too short.[20] In fact, as soon as the pressure to train was eased following deployment of the initial 5,000 recruits, the original six-month training concept was reinstituted, and the period for field training was extended.

Putting new police on the street with inadequate training and supervision may quickly backfire. In Haiti, some practical applications of classroom training were eliminated due to time-constraints, including instruction in the appropriate use of force, human rights, nonlethal intervention techniques, and driver training. The number of wrongful or accidental shootings, as well as the many vehicular accidents, speaks clearly of the necessity for taking the time, up front, to ensure that police are adequately instructed at the academy and mentored in the field.[21]

8. National merit-based standards for police recruits are a powerful tool for preventing corruption and ensuring political neutrality.

Practitioners should not be lulled into thinking that developing "community" or "decentralized" policing strategies will reduce the need for national, merit-based recruitment and selection standards or that these approaches will eliminate, or even reduce, the potential for political corruption or cronyism.

Some countries delegate police recruitment and selection to local elected authorities; in others, communal police commanders or civic leaders do the appointing. There are a number of historical examples of this type of recruitment and selection process in this hemisphere, including the U.S. While based on a laudable concept of local self-determination, results can be far from laudatory. One obvious problem is the potential lack of operational continuity within police ranks. Nonstandard operational and disciplinary requirements can contribute to lack of clarity over correct procedures, complicate training and reassignments of personnel, and diminish individual accountability. Moreover, police who serve at the pleasure of the local administration are often replaced wholesale whenever an election or some other event changes the leadership. This is not only an issue in developing countries; it is still true for many U.S. county sheriffs' offices. Whatever abstract merits or demerits characterize decentralized policing systems, their potential to degenerate into patronage systems must be addressed. In particular, decisions regarding the degree of decentralization must be considered in the local contexts. And, in Haiti, the legacy of patronage has been very disturbing.

Prior to international interventions in 1993 and 1994, rural communities were "policed" by a system of "attaches" who were appointed by the local section chief and served at the official's pleasure. This appointment process was fraught with the types of abuses that tend to characterize a "patronage" system, and over time it spawned what amounted to officially sanctioned piracy. Attache income was derived from what could be extracted from the local citizenry and those who opposed the local authority quickly felt the brunt of local enforcers.

While local nomination can be useful, it is preferable to implement nationwide standards and selection criteria.

Initially, the new Haitian government proposed that the HNP be a totally decentralized "communal" police, with local authorities having control over selection and deployment of its officers. International donors, and many Haitians, feared that this approach, given the lack of strong civic institutions at the grassroots, would simply substitute one patronage system with another. The international community was able to ensure development of a national police model, with uniform and competitive, merit-based recruitment and selection processes and documented and published standard operating procedures. The back of the traditional "atta-

che" system was broken, and with it, the abuses of many decades.

While a system of local nomination can sometimes be useful, experience indicates that it is preferable to implement a system based on the application of nationwide standards and selection criteria. The need for local participation can still be accommodated by using national-level standards to provide merit-based selection of nominees from the pool of local applicants. Local nominees can and should be validated against national criteria, or by a central police oversight commission, prior to entering the training academy. Local participation can be a critical element to overall success, but it must be handled in a way that avoids developing a "patronage" system tied directly to an elected official, or local tribal or clan leader.[22]

9. Principles of human rights and human dignity must be integrated at all levels of police policy and training.

Respect for and protection of human rights and human dignity are key to any police and criminal justice development effort. In the case of Haiti, given FAd'H's record of human rights abuses, protection of individuals and their rights was paramount in creating the new HNP. Human rights and human dignity were vital components of the HNP curriculum, just as these principles have been a strong point in USG-sponsored police development efforts in Latin America for some time.[23] Institutional development initiatives and training curricula were based upon, and continuously emphasized, a basic set of values consistent with principles of policing in a democracy. The same was true of the "mission statement," policies, and operational procedures, all of which incorporated respect for individual rights and the principles of "service" to the community that are typically lacking in former dictatorships and failed states. Integration of human rights and human dignity into written directives is important, but particularly so for "use of force" models, procedures for handling suspects and detainees, and guidelines for interviewing witnesses.

In Haiti, instruction in human rights and human dignity was conducted in conjunction with the United Nations Human Rights Mission (MICIVIH), and their human rights monitors participated directly in police training classes. Many police academies in Latin America and the Caribbean, among them the academies in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Jamaica, have made human dignity training integral to their curricula.

10. The potential of community policing principles and community relations needs to be tapped.

A critical aspect of police reform in Haiti was to change both police and public perceptions of the institution as one of community service rather than predation. The tendency, as seen in Panama, El Salvador, and Haiti, has been to meet security needs by putting officers on the street to apprehend or deter offenders without encouraging officers to build public trust and cooperation by becoming involved in community activities. In retrospect, integration of community policing principles probably should have been emphasized more in the early stages of these police assistance programs. Attempts were made to engage the community,[24] but they were exceptions rather than the norm, and the new police and civil society never developed rapport.

Perhaps the best example of how modern community policing can have a positive impact on public safety is seen in recent efforts in El Salvador. Although the civilian police (PNC) had developed substantially since its inception, both in size and capabilities, crime continued to escalate and public confidence in police protection plummeted. It was not until a 1998 community policing approach focused on crime prevention strategies and enhanced interaction between the public and the PNC through improved deployment, rapid response, and community outreach that violent crime began to drop.

11. Institutional change requires a civil society informed of the standards new police must meet and of citizens' responsibilities vis-à-vis the police and rule of law.

Changing police institutional culture from an authoritarian and repressive into a civilian, democratically oriented, service style requires more than internal reform imposed from the top. Citizens need to know the new role police are expected to play and hold them to it. Awareness must also be built of each citizen's responsibilities as well as rights vis-à-vis the

police. Looking back, one can now see that inadequate attention was paid to involving civil society representatives in program development. New police officers could have profited by learning more about the communities in which they would serve, and community leaders could have helped build the public trust needed for the new style of policing to work. Such contacts also help build public advocacy to defend and extend reforms, creating allies that reformers inside the police will need when the international presence wanes. Given the past history of policing, one cannot assume that these contacts will happen automatically or that the public will immediately grasp that the new civilian police are radically different from their predecessors. Clearly, not just the new police required training in their new roles.[25]

The service aspects of policing were also not sufficiently emphasized. Thus when the HNP was deployed, Haitian civil society did not, and likely still does not, fully appreciate the potential impact of positive relationships between community organizations and a civilian police force. The new HNP officers were trained by the international community to serve the public and follow the rule of law. Deployment was a rude shock, bringing them face to face with a civil society whose suspicions were deeply engrained by nearly 200 years of abuse, during which the apparatus of justice did not simply fail to serve ordinary citizens, but was a tool of oppression.

Because Haitians did not know what to expect from the new police, too often vigilante justice was presumed to be the only justice.

Because the vast majority of Haitians did not know what to expect from the new police, too often vigilante justice was presumed to be the only justice possible. This clash of paradigms quickly placed the young HNP officers in an impossible position when faced with angry mobs demanding summary punishment of a prisoner or arrestee. Initially at least, unlike their predecessors, the HNP did not use force against the crowds, but neither did they give up their prisoners. More than once this resulted in beatings or even execution of HNP officers or their prisoners, and even the burning of police stations. Unfortunately, over the longer term, at least some members of the HNP did live up to public expectations of "business as usual."

LOOKING BACK TO FIND THE WAY FORWARD

In 1996 most of the reviews were positive, and the HNP was considered a relative success. Today observers ask why reform has gone off track. Among the principal reasons raised in the literature, some of them already touched on, five significant impediments to HNP development have been identified:[26]

(1) Lack of political will for reform on the part of the Haitian Government — whose resolve has steadily deteriorated over time.
(2) Unwillingness to speed up reform of prosecutorial offices, the judiciary, and the courts.
(3) Lack of long-term commitment by the international community to provide resources and stay engaged with reformers.
(4) Failure of follow-on UN CivPol missions to maintain the intensity, quality, and continuity of the FTO program.
(5) Insufficient integration of police reform with civil society and NGOs.

While better than its predecessor, the HNP has fallen on difficult times. In retracing its history one finds the HNP progressing relatively smoothly until serious political fissures began to develop in Haiti and the strong presence of the international community began to decline. One cannot help but note that as the apolitical HNP gained in experience and efficiency it began to meet considerable political and other headwinds, mainly from those interests who had profited the most from an inefficient and "controllable" justice and law enforcement system in the past. As police reform became more tenuous and difficult, key members of the international donor community began to distance themselves from an endeavor that risked "going bad" — remaining passive at pivotal moments when counterbalancing pressures were most needed. The situation that has emerged, which was predicted by many practitioners, might not have happened had it been addressed in a way that fostered development of the nascent democracy in Haiti. With the departure of many donors,

and with it much of the oversight and discipline, the HNP began to revert to the old ways of the FAd'H.

PUTTING THE HNP BACK ON TRACK

The passage of OAS Resolution 822 on September 4, 2002, brings new hope for overcoming the impediments to broader international assistance to Haiti in general and to the HNP in particular. The commitments made by the government of Haiti and the reaffirmation of the OAS Special Mission to oversee those commitments, including ones related to "professional development of an independent police institution, development of a security plan, and creation of a climate of security for the 2003 elections," establish a basis for reengagement by the international community. Steps by the government of Haiti, the OAS, and the international community are now needed to move things forward.

OAS Resolution 822 brings new hope for overcoming impediments to international assistance to the HNP.

1) Recommendations for the government of Haiti:

a. Open the HNP to a survey of its current status. With the support of the international community, the HNP was built up to a force level of nearly 7,000. A survey is needed to find out the current strength of the agency (some estimates put it at 2,500–3,000); how many of the original 5,000 police officers vetted and trained with support of the international community are left; how many Gitmos are left; how many former FAd'H, palace security guards, Regina trainees, and others have been integrated into the force; and the status and disposition of the dozens of operational manuals, policy directives, and orders issued during the Denize era.

b. Reinstitute HNP requirements to follow regulations, standard operating procedures, and the established professional career ladder. Based upon assistance from the international community, an HNP career path was developed that included position descriptions, recruitment and selection standards, minimum training requirements, and other personnel measures to assure merit recruitment and promotion. Likewise, adherence to standard operating procedures should also be required, and as necessary, retraining in these procedures should be instituted.

c. Reestablish and update the HNP Strategic Plan. Director General Denize oversaw the drafting of a five-year strategic plan that was the blueprint for the development of an apolitical civilian police and that guided both Haitian efforts and international donor assistance.

d. Open to the public records pertaining to all HNP members dismissed from the force and release the names of those subsequently reinstated and those permitted to enter the HNP without vetting or training. The perceived impunity of HNP personnel is fueled by anecdotal accounts of the reinstatement of alleged criminals and human rights violators and the lack of official transparency.

e. Open to the public the list of HNP cases referred by the OIG for criminal or administrative action, and publish the current status/dispositions of these cases. The Office of Inspector General was for several years the cornerstone of police accountability and was recognized by the public and international community as a positive force in the HNP. This sense of transparency and accountability to the public must be rebuilt if the HNP is to regain stature in the eyes of society.

2) Recommendations for the OAS:

a. Authorize the Special Mission to participate in and oversee the proposed survey of the HNP. The commitments to the professional development of the HNP by the government of Haiti and any support of this effort by the international community cannot begin in earnest until a baseline survey of the HNP's personnel and other resources is completed.

b. Conduct a human rights review, in conjunction with appropriate NGOs/PVOs. The human rights record of the HNP has been brought into question. A thorough review of agency actions, policies, and procedures, including a review of the penitentiary and HNP holding facilities, is necessary.

c. Establish a donor coordination mechanism. An early strength of the HNP development project was donor coordination. The OAS should establish, with the government of Haiti, an HNP donor coordination mechanism to assure that donor aid is guided by and consistent with a new five-year strategic development plan.

3) Recommendations for the international community:

a. Support the OAS survey of the HNP and the human rights review. The international community can contribute personnel or funding, either directly or through appropriate NGOs.

b. Provide immediate support to development of a Security Plan. This should be tied directly to reinstatement of the five-year Strategic Plan for the professional development of the HNP and an operational plan for 2003 election security.

c. Expand direct development assistance to the HNP. Much external assistance to the HNP currently focuses on counternarcotics. Since effective internal policing in Haiti is critical to the interests of the U.S. and the international community in cutting drug trafficking routes, illegal immigration, and transnational crime, there is urgent need to reinstitute professionalization programs into the HNP, especially those related to police accountability.

d. Strengthen rule-of-law assistance programs. Since 1994, development of the justice sector has lagged behind the police's, and this imbalance has damaged public security. Reform programs must address the need to strengthen the entire justice sector, including judges, prosecutors, public defenders, law schools, civil society groups, and citizen education programs.

Despite the government's shortcomings, reprofessionalizing the HNP is in the self-interest of the international community.

Perhaps the best argument for expanding international support for the institutional development of the HNP was made by the U.S. president in the Presidential Memorandum on Drug Transit, dated February 23, 2002.[27] This presidential determination affirmed that U.S. "vital national interests" require continued assistance to Haiti despite Haiti's failure to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements. However, the large investment in HNP counternarcotics units cannot be effective over the long term in an environment of corruption and politicization that cripple accountability and professional management capacities. The pragmatic approach of providing assistance to Haitian counternarcotics efforts, despite the government's shortcomings, needs to be expanded into reprofessionalizing the entire HNP, not because the international community endorses the actions or policies of the current government but because it is in the rational self-interest of the international community to strengthen the HNP's ability to operate as a professional, apolitical law enforcement service capable of combating crime. For Haiti's part, it is in the interest of its people for their government to interact cooperatively with the international community, especially given the potential for regaining outside support and financial aid.

And that returns us to what is perhaps the most powerful lesson of what went right and what went wrong with the police assistance program in Haiti, which is now threatened by some HNP members reverting to the sorts of corrupt practices that characterized the FAd'H. To ensure sustainability of the many changes and improvements in life in Haiti, international donors must stay the course over the long-term. By disengaging from Haiti when their presence and the external pressure that they can bring to bear on a frequently reluctant government is direly needed, the international community may find itself free from the frustrations that characterize relations with an emerging democracy, only to find itself facing, all too soon, a situation similar to the one that necessitated the international intervention in the first place. In a broader context, this lesson of long-term commitment and the pitfalls of a premature exit-strategy should weigh heavily on planning for current and future interventions.[28]

Through the support of the international community, the HNP received professional training on a par with police around the world. They were trained in police tactics, exposed to the importance of human rights, armed and trained in the appropriate use of force, and sent out to do their jobs in the real world. However, this fledgling force needed continued mentoring and training, strong and ethical leadership, and vigorous oversight to fully develop into the type of civilian police agency, dedicated to service and protection of the public, that was envisioned in 1994. If we write off the promise of the high moral values emphasized in basic police training while their embers still exist, the "dark" forces of unchecked power and political greed will ultimately prevail in the HNP by

default. The future outcome, for good or evil, may now be in the balance. Unfortunately, the most recent chapters in the HNP's history have been largely taking place outside the view of the international community and without its technical and ethical support. Now, with the passage of OAS Resolution 822 and commitments by the government of Haiti, renewed interest and support by the international community might once again put the HNP on the right track to serving the people it was founded to serve.

ENDNOTES

[1] United Nations, "Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned from Recent Experience" (UNDPKO website: www.un.org/depts/dpko/lessons, n.d.)

[2] Oakley, Robert, M Dziedzic, E. Goldberg, eds., *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998).

[3] Most recently: Neild, Rachael, "Democratic Police Reforms in War-Torn Societies," *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Volume 1:1 (2001)

[4] Bayley, David H., *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 2001).

[5] Beidas, Sandra, Colin Granderson, and Rachel Neild, "Intervention and Institution Building in Haiti" (paper presented at the conference Constructing Security and Justice After War co-hosted by Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies and the United Sates Institute for Peace, Providence, R.I., May 14, 2002.

[6] While 5,00 recruits were trained in country at the Haitian Police Training Center, others received minimal training in a separate program based at the refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, (hence their nickname "Gitmos") so that by late 1996 the actual number of police in Haiti was near 7,000. The in-country training program provided the animating spirit as well as the bulk of the new force. In addition to the Gitmos, who were assigned to traffic control, one class of officers was trained in Regina, Canada, by the RCMP, and the Palace Security Guards (technically part of the police) were trained by specialists from the U.S. State Department's Office of Diplomatic Security.

[7] Vigil, Michael S., Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources (April 12, 2000). (DEA Website: www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct041200.htm)

[8] U.S. Department of State, Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, "International Narcotics Consolidated Strategy Report – 2001" (March 2002). (State Website: www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/8479.htm)

[9] Cherestal, Jean Marie, Open letter to the Superior Council of the Haitian National Police (October 18, 2001). (http://haitisupport.gn.apc.org/NCHR%20letter.htm)

[10] The new Police Law was completed in concert with Justice Minister Guy Malary, shortly before his assassination in Port-au-Prince.

[11] An anecdote involving HNP Class 1 illustrates the void in Haitian government leadership in the early stages of HNP development. Class representatives met with HPTC Director Sandy Mahon of the RCMP and Joe Trincellito of ICITAP to complain about not having received their authorized pay during training. The two North Americans pointed out that they were not representatives of the Haitian government and had no control over salary paid to trainees. The cadets replied just as pointedly that they had yet to meet a member of the Haitian government, and as far as they were concerned, the RCMP and ICITAP staff was the government. While demurring at the idea of joining the Haitian government, ICITAP did contact the Ministry of Finance and a cashier traveled to the Training Center to disperse salaries, avoiding Haiti's first encounter with the "blue flu."

[12] Oakley et al., op. cit.

[13] Just how quickly some within the U.S. government thought a new police could be "stood up" in Haiti is worth noting at this point. During a multi-agency planning session, one participant suggested providing selected Guantanamo refugees with three days of police training, following which they could return to Haiti as the new police. When a policing expert countered with the suggestion that perhaps the military should consider providing three days of training to refugees and use them as the invasion force, this idea was quickly abandoned.

[14] Even with the level of advanced cooperation and coordination of the police program in Haiti, political forces outside of the planning framework produced both the expatriot "Regina" trainees and the Gitmo trainees cited earlier. These disparate and piecemeal approaches to training created a serious problem of how to integrate these individuals into what was otherwise a homogeneously recruited and trained force.

[15] Timing is critical. The police mission and authority should be part of the earliest discussions regarding the creation of a local, semiautonomous government, and is an essential ingredient in establishing a police development and planning framework. Defining responsibilities can be a difficult issue, and often there will be pressure to "work it

out later." However, as seen in Bosnia and more recently in Kosovo, the details are much more difficult and time consuming to work out if they are not included in the initial agreement, when political clout is strongest.

[16] Training is all too frequently front-loaded. In fact the bulk of the training effort should follow the establishment of a legal foundation, organizational development, and the promulgation of policies and procedures. Until these broader policies and procedures are established, training cannot be effectively tailored to the specific needs and legal framework of the host country.

[17] For years after the creation of the new PNP from recycled PDF members, the military style of the PNP was a constant concern, suggesting the new force might slip backward to its predecessor's ways. Nearly a decade after initial training, and despite the infusion of thousands of new civilian recruits, concerns are still heard about the number of ex-military officers in senior management positions and the weight a "military" perspective carries in the PNP.

[18] Unfortunately some former FAd'H members who were appointed to the IPSF but weeded out after vetting were later appointed to senior positions, or were given "informal" positions by the Haitian government.

[19] The pre-*Harlan County* plan called for the training of 5,000 police in five years. In the 1994 program, this timeframe had to be reduced to slightly more than one year to accommodate the troop withdrawal schedule.

[20] Additional pressure was placed on the training program when, in April 1996, the USG decided to double the number of trainees at the HPTC from 1,500 to 3.000. The already overburdened center, originally built to accommodate a maximum of 300 students, could not absorb the increase. The decision was then made to use a military base in Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, for part of the training, necessitating monthly Air Force flights of 1,500 students between Port-au-Prince and Missouri. This decision also had ramifications far beyond the sizeable logistical and cost considerations associated with its implementation. By putting more recruits through training at an accelerated pace without sufficient supervision, equipment, or logistical support, the newly deployed recruits had no system or institution upon which to rely, and were left to their own — inexperienced — devices, sometimes with dire consequences.

[21] The hidden costs of curtailing practical applications of some training and eliminating driver's education altogether to save time were implicitly acknowledged by the need for ICITAP to later establish a remedial firearms training program and more explicitly by the wrecked HNP vehicles that quickly piled up around Port-au-Prince and other locations. While most vehicles donated to the HNP were relics of Operation Desert Storm, some of the wrecked ones were new, with less than 10 miles on the odometer. Ultimately ICITAP had to establish a vehicle repair facility for damaged police cars.

[22] For practitioners who will be involved in development planning for Afghanistan, it should be noted that even Somalia, with its strong decentralized Islamic clan culture, maintained a true national police for decades prior to the collapse of governmental authority. The Somali National Police was made up of mixed clan units, all of which were trained in a centralized training academy and deployed without regard to clan affiliation. This example demonstrates that a national police can be implemented in a clan-based society, without resorting to "Balkanization."

[23] Stromsem, Janice M., "Building Civilian Police Forces: Role of USAID and ICITAP in Police Reform in Latin America" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations, New York, NY, June 16-18, 1999).

[24] On Wednesday nights, community leaders were invited to the HPTC auditorium where discussions were held with assembled police trainees.

[25] A clear example of the need for citizen education relates to a conversation between one of the authors and a member of the interim cabinet formed following negotiation of the Governor's Island Accords in 1993. Following a lengthy meeting at the home of the interim prime minister, one minister approached the author to request copies of a brochure on democracy. "You see," he explained, "we in Haiti do not really understand what that means."

[26] Stromsem, Jan, and Joseph Trincellito, "Peacebuilding in Haiti: Lessons Learned in Building the Haitian National Police" (paper presented at the International Peace Academy's Lessons Learned Seminar: Peacebuilding in Haiti, January 23–24, 2002), 16–17.

[27] Presidential Determination No. 2002-07, President's Report to Congress on Major Drug Transit of Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries Under the FY 2002 Modification to the Annual Drug Certification Procedures (February 23, 2002, Washington, D.C.). checking Congressional Record or in the Federal Register can be found at (www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rm/2002/8471.htm)

[28] In fact several practitioners, including the authors of this paper, have argued that the international community should have increased their assistance rather than leave when the situation began to deteriorate in Haiti. Obviously it would have been a difficult political and financial undertaking, but it would be more costly over the long term to not protect the benefits flowing from the human and material resources invested in the Haiti project since the early 1990s.

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Joseph Trincellito *is an international consultant specializing in rule-of-law and criminal justice assistance. During his nearly 30-year career in the U.S. Department of Justice, he held management positions in the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. National Central Bureau of INTERPOL, and the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), where he served as Associate Director for Operations. His involvement in the HNP development project began in 1994 when he supervised the international team that designed the Haitian National Police training curriculum and lesson plans. Mr. Trincellito continued to oversee the HNP training and development effort and subsequently was assigned management oversight over both the ICITAP police development project and the prosecutorial development project implemented by the Justice Department's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training.*

Information on the Haiti Program



The Trinity College Haiti Program seeks to provide accurate, up-to-date, and insightful information and analysis to individuals and organizations involved in current Haitian political, economic and social issues. The Haiti Program also seeks to raise awareness of the forthcoming 200th anniversary of Haiti's independence in 2004 by providing a forum for the exchange and dissemination of information on the contributions made over space and time by Haiti and the U.S.-based Haitian Diaspora population to the well being of the United States. The Trinity College Haiti Program is a continuation and expansion of the Georgetown University Haiti Program, which was founded in 1994 in collaboration with Johns Hopkins University.

The Haiti Program works with two core constituencies. One constituency is composed of policy makers and program planners in agencies and branches of the U.S. government as well as representatives of academic, non-governmental and international organizations. The second constituency is composed of members of the Haitian-American population actively involved in Haiti and US-Haiti issues. Members of both constituencies are convened periodically under the auspices of the *Haiti Study Group* to participate in seminars and symposia on topical issues.

The Haiti Program achieves its objectives through seminars and symposia, publications, and the development of educational materials. Seminars, usually off-the-record and by invitation only for members of the Haiti Study Group (HSG), last for two hours and involve specially invited guest speakers. The full-day symposia, also by invitation for members of the HSG and other guests, address issues related to Haiti's political and economic development; the significance of its independence to the United States; and the contemporary contribution of Haitian-Americans to U.S. political, economic, and social vitality.

To complement its seminars and symposia, the Haiti Program also publishes occasional Briefing Papers on current issues, along with Haiti Info Circulars. The latter, in addition to containing reports and articles written by program collaborators, include symposium reports. All published materials are posted on the Haiti Program's web site.

In addition to its Internet home at www.trinitydc.edu, the Haiti Program has created an educational web site, www.Haiti-USA.org. The website features information on historical linkages between Haiti and the U.S., and on today's growing communities of Haitians in the United States. It serves as an educational tool for all individuals and organizations.

The Haiti Program also sponsors occasional briefings for Congressional Staff members and others, and participates in meetings, consultations and conferences on issues linked to its work. The Trinity College Haiti Program is directed by Dr. Robert Maguire.

The Trinity College Haiti Papers are designed to serve the needs of decision makers and analysts interested in Haiti and the Haitian Diaspora in the United States. The Papers are an occasional publication of the Haiti Program, a unit of Programs in International Affairs at Trinity College, Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and not the Haiti Program or the College. Copies of this and other Haiti-relevant publications can be obtained by writing to the Haiti Program, Trinity College, 125 Michigan Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20017 or by visiting the Project's website at: http://www.trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/Haiti_Program.htm

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